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Abstract. Despite the large number of its references, this paper is less a survey
than a systematic exposition, in an unifying framework and assuming convexity as
well on the consumption side as on the production side, of the different equilibrium
concepts elaborated for studying provision of public goods. As weak as possible
conditions for their existence and their optimality properties are proposed. The
general conclusion is that the drawbacks of the different equilibrium concepts lead
to founding public economic policy either on direct Pareto improving government
interventions or on state enforcement of decentralized mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
What is a public good? Should it be publicly or privately provided? How should be shared the
burden of the costs of its production? The aim of this paper is to gather and to present, from an
analytical point of view and in relation with a normative theory of public expenditure and public
taxation, the answers given to these questions in the framework of the general equilibrium model
as defined in 1954 by Arrow–Debreu [1], promptly extended to accommodate public goods, and
since then constantly generalized.
We will leave outside this survey “positive” general equilibrium analysis [22, 27, 38, 51, 52, 53]
that have as a common feature to study mixed or “second best” economies where the presence and
role of a public sector are explicitely modelled and to consider public policy decisions on taxes,
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2lump sum transfers and (possibly) the provision of public goods as decisions to be kept separated
from the analysis of the competitive functioning of the economy.
Most of the normative theory is done in relation with Samuelson’s definition of public goods. A
(pure) public good, more precisely a collective consumption good, is formally defined by Samuel-
son [45, 46] as a good whose each individual’s consumption leads to no subtraction from any other
individual’s consumption. In this definition, individual’s consumption is put as well for consumer’s
consumption of the good as for its use as an input by a producer. The problem dealt with by
Samuelson is the research of conditions that guarantee optimality of the public goods provision.
The conclusion (the two-folds message delivered by Samuelson’s papers) is first that optimum ex-
ists, is multiple, depending on the particular form of the social utility function. But, the externality
in consumers’ preferences, inherent to the definition of public goods, prevents any implementation
of their optimal provision by a market mechanism: as often noticed, it is not in the interest of indi-
viduals to reveal their preferences, a basic prerequisite for a functioning market solution. Likewise,
a planning procedure would require from an omniscient planner to know all consumers’ marginal
rates of substitution between private and public goods in order to set personalized prices which
would allow for financing the chosen optimal public goods provision.1
The different characteristics (non-excludability, non-rejectability) assigned by Samuelson to the
restrictive definition of (pure) public goods may be combined in more flexible ways [41, 43, 60, 61]
with a more specific sharing of the produced public goods, more subtle characteristics may be
introduced in the analysis, more sophisticated modellings of externality may be proposed which
take in account phenomena of congestion and cost of access to public goods or explicitly introduce
transformation technologies of produced public goods into shared consumption goods [47, 59].
Public goods may also be simply modelled as states of the world that affect the utility level
of consumers and shape the technological sets of producers. All these different variants in the
definition of externality may be accomodated to fit with the optimality and the equilibrium analysis
which make the content of equilibrium theories. The basic hypothesis is still that the domain of
consumer’s sovereignty should be extended to the choice of the amount of public goods to be
provided; the basic methodology is that optimum should be shown to be achieved through a
decentralized process where public goods are produced by producers and sold to consumers. It
is under these basic hypothesis and methodology that the institutional questions raised at the
beginning of this introduction aim to finding an answer founded on a purely economic ground.
In order to see how equilibrium theory fulfills this research programme in response to the
open questions raised by Samuelson, we will first set the general framework of a competitive
private ownership production economy with public goods. Samuelson’s definition of (pure) public
goods will be used as a first approximation, a benchmark for ulterior study of more complicated
consumption phenomena. The objective is to precise, in this canonical framework, existence,
properties, significance and limits of two equilibrium concepts refered to by Samuelson: the private
provision equilibrium popularized thirty years after Samuelson’s articles by the famous paper of
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian [3], and the translation by Foley [21] of what is called by Samuelson
the equilibrium solution of Lindahl [34, 35].
We will see that, under very mild assumptions, equilibrium exists in the private provision model,
is optimal in a sense of “constrained optimality” that we will define, and belongs to the “constrained
core”. It even belongs (see [14]) to the set of “constrained Edgeworth equilibria” and constrained
1The same conclusion will hold with the study of more dynamic planning procedures as [10, 36,
37] which require too much information on individual characteristics for the social planner.
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model. While (see [16]) constrained Pareto optimal allocations can be decentralized as equilibria of
an economy identical to the original one except for a convenient redistribution of consumers’ initial
endowments and profit shares. In other words, the whole machinery of general equilibrium theory
can be applied to this model which is intended to figurate the case when provision of public goods
is done by the way of charities, fondations and other corporate social responsability institutions.
Since the welfare of each consumer depends not on his own provision but on the total provision of
public goods, the private provision model appears as a particular case of more general equilibrium
models where individuals value the consumption of the others, whether it is by altruism, envy
or simply because they look at their relative wealth. As far as provision of public goods is the
unique individual external concern of agents, private provision equilibrium is sub-optimal for the
only optimality notion which makes sense in public goods provision theory. This sub-optimality
is considered as the main drawback of the private provision model and calls for solutions to this
market failure.
Under the same mild assumptions, Lindahl–Foley equilibrium exists. Optimality of equilibrium
is a direct consequence of the definitions. However, decentralizing optimal allocations has not the
same interpretation in terms of redistribution of the initial wealth as in the case where all goods
are private. A possible solution is in the introduction of a third equilibrium concept, defined by
Foley in [20, 21], reminiscent of the Wicksellian [62] principle of unanimity and voluntary consent
in the matching of public expenditure and taxation. As in [30], it will be denominated in this
paper, Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium.
Lindahl–Foley equilibrium allocations are easily seen to be Wicksell–Foley public competitive
equilibrium allocations and, as such, (weakly) Pareto optimal allocations. However their belonging
to the core (a property which gives, according to Foley [21], more rationale to considering Lindahl–
Foley equilibrium allocations) requires two additional assumptions, made by Foley and many others
public goods provision theorists. Namely that consumers’ preferences be monotonely increasing
with the consumed amount of each public good and that using public goods be unnecessary in
the public goods production. Then, exactly as in private goods economies, optimal allocations
can be decentralized with Lindahl–Foley prices as Lindahl–Foley equilibria, after redistribution
of initial endowments and profit shares of consumers. Moreover, under these two assumptions,
it was directly proved in [18] that the core of a public good economy is nonempty, as well as
the set of Edgeworth equilibria corresponding to a convenient definition of replication of a public
goods economy. Lindahl–Foley equilibria are obtained by decentralizing with Lindahl-Foley prices
Edgeworth equilibria. So that the whole machinery of equilibrium theory can be applied to the
Lindahl–Foley model, establishing a complete symmetry between Lindahl–Foley equilibrium for
public goods economies and Walras equilibrium for private goods economies.
However, the two previous assumptions prevent any application of the model to analysis of neg-
ative externalities (public bads) and do not fit with the empirical evidence that most public goods,
besides being the extreme case of externalities in consumption, enter also as production factors
which influence the firm’s ability to produce (think of education, health, research, transportation
means, etc...). This paper will show that these unpleasant assumptions are necessary neither for
the definition nor for the existence as well of private provision equilibrium as of Lindahl–Foley
equilibrium.
Before closing this introduction, it is necessary to stress that the results reported until now
strongly depend, as we will see, on convexity assumptions on preferences and production. However,
externalities may generate fundamental non-convexities (see [54, 55]). More simply, many so-called
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4collective or public goods are also classical examples of decreasing costs. Non-convexity on the
production side requires government intervention for enforcing pricing rules and the design of
revenue distribution rules allowing consumers to survive and to finance a possible deficit in the
production of public goods. This adds new difficulties in the definition of market mechanisms
for public goods provision, To deal with this case and complement this exposition, a companion
paper [17] will rely on [26] for conditions of existence of a private provision equilibrium in non-
convex production economies, on [5] for existence of Lindahl equilibria, on [33] for the extension
of the second welfare theorem in economies with non-convexities and public goods, on [44] for the
extension to the non-convex case of the Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium concept.
The companion paper will also precise the relations of all results (convex case and nononvex case)
with the abundant cost share equilibrium literature [7, 8, 9, 30, 31, 40, 58] that followed in this
domain a seminal Mas-Colell paper [39].
The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set the general model of a compet-
itive private ownership production economy with public goods with its different equilibrium and
optimality concepts. In Sections 3 and 4, we give sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence
respectively in the private provision and the Lindahl–Foley models. In Sections 5 and 6, coming
back to the Samuelson set of questions, we look for decentralisation of optimal allocations and to
their relation with the core of the economy. As a conclusion, in Section 7, we show how equilib-
rium analysis of provision of public goods calls for re-introducing government as an economic agent
generally absent from equilibrium models, providing foundations for a theory of economic policy
of market economies.
2. The economy and its equilibrium and optimality concepts
We will define equilibrium and optimum concepts in the framework of a canonical private own-
ership production economy with finitely many agents, a finite set L of private goods and a finite
set K of public goods
E =
(
〈RL × RK ,RL × RK〉, (Xi, Pi, ei)i∈I , (Yj)j∈J , (θij) i∈I
j∈J
)
in which the existence of public goods entering as arguments in the consumers’ preferences is the
only considered externality.
• RL × RK , canonically ordered, is the commodity space and price space of the model. As
usual, we will denote by (p, pg) · (z, zg) = p · z+ pg · zg the evaluation of (z, zg) ∈ RL×RK
at prices (p, pg) ∈ RL × RK .
• There is a finite set I of consumers who jointly consume private goods and a same amount
of public goods that they eventually provide. Each consumer i has a consumption set
Xi ⊂ RL × RK , a preference correspondence Pi :
∏
h∈I Xh → Xi to be precisely defined
below and an initial endowment ei ∈ RL×RK . The interpretation ofXi and, consequently,
the definition of Pi are different in the private provision model and in the Lindahl–Foley
model.
– In the private provision model (see [56]), for a generic element (xi, x
g
i ) ∈ Xi, xi is
the private commodity consumption of consumer i, while xgi denotes his private
provision of public goods. If piG denotes the projection onto RK of RL × RK ,
consumer i’s preferences are typically represented by a correspondence Pi : Xi ×∏
h6=i pi
G(Xh)→ Xi which indicates for each x =
(
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
) ∈ Xi×∏h6=i piG(Xh)
the set Pi(x) of the elements of Xi that consumer i prefers to (xi, x
g
i ) taking as
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to his own provision, determines the amount of public goods he actually
enjoys.2
– In the Lindahl–Foley model, for a generic element (xi, Gi) ∈ Xi of consumer i’s
choice set, xi is still the private commodity consumption of consumer i, while the
components of the vector Gi denote the amount of each public good that household
i claims. Since the existence of public goods is the only considered externality of our
economy, Pi : Xi → Xi is simply a correspondence expressing a binary relation on
Xi.
• There is a finite set J of producers which jointly produce private and public goods. Each
firm is characterized by a production set Yj ⊂ RL × RK . We denote by (yj , ygj ) a generic
point of Yj . Y =
∑
j∈J Yj denotes the total production set.
• For every firm j and each consumer i, the firm shares 0 ≤ θij ≤ 1 classically represent
a contractual claim of consumer i on the profit of firm j when it faces a price (p, pg) ∈
RL × RK . In a core and Edgeworth equilibrium approach, the relative shares θij reflect
consumer’s stock holdings which represent proprietorships of production possibilities and
θijYj is interpreted as a technology set at i’s disposal in Yi. As usual,
∑
i∈I θij = 1, for
each j.
In a model where consumers are supposed to privately provide an amount of public goods that they
all jointly consume, feasibility of a consumption-private provision allocation (xi, x
g
i )i∈I is
expressed by the relation ∑
i∈I
(xi, x
g
i ) ∈
{∑
i∈I
ei
}
+
∑
j∈J
Yj .
Definition 2.1. A private provision equilibrium of E is a t-uple(
(xi, x
g
i )i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g) ∈
∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
j∈J
Yj × (RL × RK) \ {0}
such that
(1) for every j ∈ J , for every (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj, (p, pg) · (yj , ygj ) ≤ (p, pg) · (yj , ygj ),
(2) for every i ∈ I, given the provisions (xgh)h6=i of the other consimers, (xi, xgi ) is optimal
for the correspondence Pi : Xi ×
∏
h6=i pi
G(Xh)→ Xi in the budget set
Bi(p, pg) =
{
(xi, x
g
i ) ∈ Xi : p · xi + pg · xgi ≤ (p, pg) · ei +
∑
j∈J
θij(p, pg) · (yj , ygj )
}
,
(3)
∑
i∈I(xi, x
g
i ) =
∑
i∈I ei +
∑
j∈J(yj , y
g
j ).
Condition (1) states that each firm maximizes its profit taking as given the vector price (p, pg).
Condition (2) states that, taking as given prices and the public good provisions of the other
consumers, (xi, x
g
i ) is an optimal choice for consumer i in a budget set where he pays at the
2For exemple, if ui : RL × RK → R denotes the utility function of consumer i (depending on
his consumption of private goods and the total provision of public goods), for
(
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
) ∈
Xi ×
∏
h6=i pi
G(Xh), Pi
(
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
)
= {(x′i, x′gi ) ∈ Xi : ui(x′i, x′gi +
∑
h6=i x
g
h) > ui(xi, x
g
i +∑
h6=i x
g
h)}.
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6common market equilibrium price his consumption of private goods and his provision of public
goods. Condition (3) states the feasibility of the equilibrium allocation as defined above.
In the Lindahl–Foley model, at a feasible private and public goods consumption allocation all
consumers consume a same amount of public goods. For the sake of coherence, we assume that
consumers have no endowment in public goods and set ei = (ωi, 0) where ωi ∈ RL is the
private good endowment of consumer i. Feasibility of a pair
(
(xi)i∈I , G
)
where for every i ∈ I,
(xi, G) ∈ Xi is expressed by the relation
(
∑
i∈I
xi, G) ∈
{∑
i∈I
(ωi, 0)
}
+
∑
j∈J
Yj .
Definition 2.2. A Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of E is a t-uple(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g
i )
) ∈∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
j∈J
Yj ×
(
(RL × R|I|K) \ {0})
such that:
(1) for every j ∈ J , for every (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj, (p,
∑
i∈I p
g
i ) · (yj , ygj ) ≤ (p,
∑
i∈I p
g
i )) · (yj , ygj ),
(2) for every i ∈ I, (xi, G) is optimal for the correspondence P i : Xi → Xi in the budget set
Bi(p, p
g
i )) =
{
(xi, G) ∈ Xi : p · xi + pgi ·G ≤ p · ωi +
∑
j∈J
θij(p,
∑
i∈I
pgi ) · (yj , ygj )
}
,
(3) (
∑
i∈I xi, G) =
∑
i∈I(ωi, 0) +
∑
j∈J(yj , y
g
j ).
If, in the previous definition, we set pg =
∑
i∈I p
g
i , each p
g
i can be thought of as a vector of
personalized consumption public good prices for the consumer i (See for example Foley [21],
Milleron [42, Section 3]), while pg is the vector of production public good prices. Then, as in
the definition of private provision equilibrium, Condition (1) means that each firm maximizes its
profit taking as given the common vector price (p, pg). Condition (2) means that each consumer
chooses a consumption of private goods and claims an amount of public goods provision, so as to
optimize his preferences in his budget set taking as given the common price of private goods and
his personalized price vector for public goods. With Condition (3), equilibrium is characterized
by feasibility of the allocation, as defined in the Lindahl–Foley model, thus, in particular, by an
unanimous consent on the amount of public goods to be produced.
In the next equilibrium definition, feasibility of the equilibrium allocation is defined as in
Lindahl–Foley equilibrium, but the vector of personalized public good prices is replaced by a
vector of personalized taxes whose sum is equal to the equilibrium cost of the private goods used
for producing the equilibrium provision of public goods. In order to understand the equilibrium
conditions, let us call government proposal relative to the price system (p, pg) a couple(
G, (ti)i∈I
)
of an amount of pubic goods provision with taxes to pay for it. Besides classical
market clearing, an additional equilibrium mechanism guarantees, given the equilibrium prices, an
unanimous negative consensus on the equilibrium government proposal.
Definition 2.3. A Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium of E is a t-uple(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g), (ti)i∈I
) ∈∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
j∈J
Yj ×
(
(RL × RK) \ {0})× RI
such that:
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7(1) for every j ∈ J , for every (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj, (p, pg) · (yj , ygj ) ≤ (p, pg)) · (yj , ygj ) := pij(p, pg),
(2) for every i ∈ I, (xi, G) is optimal for the correspondence P i : Xi → Xi in the budget set
Bi(p, pg, ti)) =
{
(xi, G) ∈ Xi : p · xi + ti ≤ p · ωi
}
,
(3) There is no
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (ti)i∈I
) ∈∏i∈I Xi ×RI such that ∑i∈I ti = pg ·G−∑j pij(p, pg)
with for every i ∈ I, (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) and p · xi + ti ≤ p · ωi.
(4) (
∑
i∈I xi, G) =
∑
i∈I(ωi, 0) +
∑
j∈J(yj , y
g
j ) and
∑
i∈I ti = p
g ·G−∑j∈J pij(p, pg).
In the previous definition, Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium involves profit max-
imization by producers (Condition (1)), optimization by consumers of their private goods con-
sumption, given the equilibrium provision of public goods, under the after-tax budget constraint
(Condition (2)), and the impossibility of finding a new government proposal such that the sum of
taxes together with the sum of equilibrium profits finances the provision of public good and that
appears to every consumer to leave him better off (Condition (3)). Condition (4) adds to feasibility
of the equilibrium allocation the requirement that together with the sum of equilibrium profits,
the sum of equilibrium taxes finances the equilibrium value of public goods. In view of Condition
(1), it is readily seen that
∑
i∈I ti = −p ·
∑
j∈J yj = p ·
∑
i∈I(ωi − xi).
Notice that in each equilibrium definition, and in view of feasibility of equilibrium allocation
and profit maximization, it is easily seen that the budget constraint of each consumer is bound at
equilibrium. The next proposition precises the relation between Lindahl–Foley and Wicksell–Foley
public competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1. Setting pg =
∑
i∈I p
g
i and ti = p
g
i ·G−
∑
j∈J θij(p ·yj+pg ·ygj ), a Lindahl–Foley
equilibrium
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g
i )
)
is a Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Condition (1) in Definition 2.3 follows from Condition (1) in Definition 2.2. For each
i ∈ I, Bi(p, pg, ti)) ⊂ Bi(p, pgI)) and (xi, G) ∈ Bi(p, pgI)) ∩ Bi(p, pg, ti)), so that Condition (2) in
Definition 2.3 follows from Condition (2) in Definition 2.2. To verify Condition (3) in Definition 2.3,
assume by contraposition that
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (ti)i∈I
) ∈ ∏i∈I Xi × RI verifies ∑i∈I ti = pg · G −∑
j pij(p, p
g) with for every i ∈ I, (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) and p · xi + ti ≤ p · ωi. From Condition (2)
in Definition 2.2, we deduce for each i ∈ I, p · xi + pgi ·G > p · ωi +
∑
j∈J θij(p,
∑
i∈I p
g
i ) · (yj , ygj )
and summing over i, p ·∑i∈I xi + pg ·G > p ·∑i∈I ωi +∑j∈J(p, pg) · (yj , ygj ). But, in view of the
condition on the sum of taxes, one has also: p ·∑i∈I xi+pg ·G ≤ p ·∑i∈I ωi+∑j∈J(p, pg) ·(yj , ygj ),
which yields a contradiction.
As usually, the quasiequilibrium definitions keep in each model the profit maximization and
feasibility conditions of equilibrium and replace preference optimization in the budget set by the
requirement that each consumer binds its budget constraint and could not be strictly better off
spending strictly less.
Definition 2.4. A private provision quasiequilibrium of E is a t-uple(
(xi, x
g
i )i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g) ∈
∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
j∈J
Yj × (RL × RK) \ {0}
verifying conditions (1) and (3) of Definition 2.1 and
(2’) for every i ∈ I, p · xi + pg · xgi = (p, pg) · ei +
∑
j∈J θij(p, p
g) · (yj , ygj ) and (xi, xgi ) ∈
Pi
(
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
)⇒ p · xi + pg · xgi ≥ p · xi + pg · xgi .
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(
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
)
actually implies p · xi + pg · xgi > p · xi + pg · xgi ,
the private provision quasi-equilibrium is said to be non-trivial.
Definition 2.5. A Lindahl–Foley quasiequilibrium of E is a t-uple(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
) ∈∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
j∈J
Yj ×
(
(RL × R|I|K \ {0})
verifying Conditions (1) and (3) of Definition 2.2 and
(2’) for every i ∈ I, p · xi+ pgi ·G = p ·ωi+
∑
j∈J θij(p, p
g) · (yj , ygj ) and (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G)⇒
p · xi + pgi ·G ≥ p · xi + pgi ·G.
If for some i ∈ I, (xi, G) ∈ Pi
(
(xi, G)
)
actually implies p · xi + pgi · G > p · xi + pgi · G, the
Lindahl–Foley quasi-equilibrium is said to be non-trivial.
As equilibrium concepts, optimality and core concepts are very different in the private provi-
sion and in the Lindahl–Foley model or in the public competitive equilibrium model (Recall that
Lindahl–Foley and public competitive equilibrium share the same condition for feasibility of an
allocation).
Definition 2.6. A Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocation
(
(xi)i∈I , G
)
is (weakly) Pareto
optimal if there exists no Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocation
(
(xi)i∈I , G
)
such that
(xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) for each i ∈ I.
Let S ⊂ I, S 6= 6© be a coalition.
Definition 2.7. Lindahl–Foley feasibility for S of the pair
(
(xi)i∈S , GS
)
, where for each i ∈ S,
(xi, GS) ∈ Xi, is defined by
(
∑
i∈S
xi, G
S) ∈
{∑
i∈S
(ωI , 0)
}
+
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈J
θijYj .
The Lindahl–Foley S-feasible pair
(
(xi)i∈S , GS
)
improves upon or blocks the Lindahl–Foley
feasible allocation
(
(xi)i∈I , G
)
if
(xi, GS) ∈ Pi(xi, G) for each i ∈ S.
The core C(E) is the set of all Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocations that no coalition can
improve upon.
In the private provision model, preferences of each agent are constrained by the public good
private provisions of the other agents. For this reason, we will speak of constrained optimality
(some kind of second best concept) and of constrained core.
Definition 2.8. A feasible consumption allocation (xi, x
g
i )i∈I of the private provision model is
(weakly) constrained Pareto optimal if there is no feasible consumption allocation (xi, x
g
i )i∈I
such that
(xi, x
g
i ) ∈ Pi
(
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
)
for each i ∈ I.
If we set GS =
∑
i∈S x
g
i , feasibility for the coalition S of (xi, x
g
i )i∈S ∈
∏
i∈S Xi in the private
provision model corresponds to S-feasibility of
(
(xi)i∈S , GS
)
in the Lindahl–Foley model.
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sumption allocation (xi, x
g
i )i∈I via the S-feasible allocation (xi, x
g
i )i∈S ∈
∏
i∈S Xi if
(xi, x
g
i ) ∈ Pi
(
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
)
for each i ∈ S.
The constrained core Cc(E) is the set of all feasible consumption allocations of the private pro-
vision model that no coalition can improve upon.
It simply follows from the definitions that a private provision equilibrium consumption allo-
cation is (weakly) constrained Pareto optimal and belongs to the constrained core Cc(E)) of the
economy. It even belongs to the set of “constrained Edgeworth equilibria” (See [14] for a defi-
nition and a study of conditions which allow for a decentralization with prices of a constrained
Edgeworth equilibrium allocation as a private provision equilibrium consumption allocation). But
a private provision equilibrium consumption allocation has no reason to lead to a
Pareto optimal provision of public goods. In suitably defined private provision models, one
can verify that, unlike Lindahl–Foley equilibrium consumption allocations, consumption–private
provision equilibrium allocations do not satisfy Samuelson’s first order conditions for optimality
and examples abound in the litterature [3, 56] of redistributions of initial endowments that increase
the equilibrium public provision of public goods, thus are Pareto improving in case of monotone
increasing preferences relative to public goods. With the free-riding problem, sub-optimality of
equilibrium is the main drawback of the private provision equilibrium concept.
In counterpart, it also simply follows from the definitions that a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium
consumption allocation is (weakly) Pareto optimal but does not necessarily belong to the core
C(E). We will give in Section 4 sufficient conditions for Lindahl–Foley equilibrium allocations
to belong to the core. In the two next sections, we study the consistency of the just defined
equilibrium concepts by looking for conditions of existence of private provision equilibria as well
as of Lindahl–Foley equilibria.
3. Quasiequilibrium and equilibrium existence in the private provision model
In the framework of the private provision model, in order to get an equilibrium result, we will
use the strategy of proof of Shafer–Sonnenschein [51] associating to the private provision economy
an abstract economy and its conditions for equilibrium existence. However, we depart from [51] in
three respects. We look for an equilibrium without disposal (as in Shafer [49]). We also first prove
the existence of a quasiequilibrium, before looking for additional conditions under which the quasi-
equilibrium is an equilibrium. For this, we use a definition and existence result of quasiequilibrium
in abstract economies borrowed from a paper of mine [12], unpublished in 1980, published in french
in 1981 in citeFlo81, and used (with all details of its proof) in subsequent published papers (see, for
example, [15]). Finally, using ideas of Gale–Mas-Colell [23, 24], we slightly weaken the continuity
assumptions on preference correspondences used by Shafer–Sonnenschein.
Let us first give the definition of an abstract economy and its quasi-equilibrium.
Definition 3.1. An abstract economy (or generalized qualitative game) is completely spec-
ified by
Γ = ((Xi, αi, Pi)i∈N )
where N is a finite set of agents (players) and, for each i ∈ N ,
• Xi is a choice set (or strategy set),
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• the correspondence
αi :
∏
k∈N
Xk → Xi
is called constraint correspondence (or feasible strategy correspondence),
• the correspondence
Pi :
∏
k∈N
Xk → Xi
is a preference correspondence.
Let X =
∏
k∈N Xk. For each x ∈ X, αi(x) is interpreted as the set of possible strategies for
player i, given the choice (xk)k 6=i of the other players. For each x ∈ X, under the condition that
xi /∈ Pi(x), Pi(x) is interpreted as the set of elements of Xi strictly preferred by player i to xi
when the choice of the other players is (xk)k 6=i.
Now, for each i ∈ N , let βi :
∏
k∈N Xk → Xi be a correspondence satisfying for all x ∈
∏
k∈N Xk
(3.1) βi(x) ∈ αi(x),
(3.2) if βi(x) 6= 6© , then cl(βi(x)) = cl(αi(x)).
Definition 3.2. Given β = (βi)i∈N as above, x = (xi)i∈N ∈ X is a β-quasiequilibrium of Γ if
for each for each i ∈ N ,
(1) xi ∈ αi(x)
(2) Pi(x) ∩ βi(x) = 6©.
It is an equilibrium if or each for each i ∈ N ,
(1) xi ∈ αi(x)
(2) Pi(x) ∩ αi(x) = 6©.
Lemma 3.3. Let Γ =
(
(Xi, αi, Pi)i∈N , X
)
be an abstract economy with a finite set N of agents
where X is a nonempty closed convex subset of
∏
i∈N Xi, and αi : X → Xi and Pi : X → Xi are
correspondences respectively interpreted as constraint and preference correspondences for agent i.
Let for each i ∈ N , βi : X → Xi satisfying the above relations 3.1 and 3.2. Assume that for every
i ∈ N ,
(a) Xi is a nonempty compact convex subset of some inite dimensional Euclidean vector space,
(b) αi is an upper semicontinuous and nonempty closed convex valued correspondence,
(c) βi is convex valued,
(d) Pi is a convex valued correspondence such that for all x ∈
∏
k∈N Xk xi /∈ Pi(x) and the
correspondence x→ βi(x) ∩ Pi(x) is lower semicontinuous.
Then Γ has a β-quasiequilibrium x. It is an equilibrium (that is, for each i ∈ N , Pi(x)∩αi(x) = 6©)
provided that for every i, βi(x) 6= 6© and Pi(x) is open in Xi.
Coming back to the economy E , let
A(E) =
((xi, xgi )i∈I , (yj , ygj )j∈J) ∈∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
j∈J
Yj :
∑
i∈I
(xi, x
g
i ) =
∑
i∈I
ei +
∑
j∈J
(yj , y
g
j )

be the set of feasible allocations. Let X̂i, X̂ and Ŷj denote the projections of A(E) respectively on
Xi,
∏
i∈I Xi and Yj . We make on E the following assumptions.
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A.1: For each i ∈ I,
(a) Xi is convex and closed, and X̂i is compact,
(b) Pi : Xi ×
∏
h6=i pi
G(Xh)→ Xi is lower semicontinuous,
(c) For each (xh, x
g
h)h∈I ∈ X̂, Pi
(
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
)
) is convex,
and (xi, x
g
i ) ∈ clPi
(
(xi, x
g
i ), (x
g
h)h6=i
) \ Pi((xi, xgi ), (xgh)h6=i)),
(d) ei ∈ Xi −
∑
j∈J θijYj ;
A.2: For each j ∈ J , Yj is convex and closed, and Ŷj is compact.
The following proposition is proved using Lemma 3.3 and standard techniques explained in [49, 16].
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumptions A.1 and A.2, the private provision economic model E has
a quasiequilibrium
(
(xi, x
g
i )i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g) ∈∏i∈I Xi ×∏j∈J Yj × (RL ×RK) \ {0}. Under
the additional continuity assumption that each correspondence Pi has open (in Xi) values at every
(xh, x
g
h) ∈ X̂, the quasiequilibrium is nontrivial if
∑
i∈I ei ∈ int
(∑
i∈I Xi −
∑
j∈J Yj
)
.
Note that the quasiequilibrium price (p, pg) is nonnull but, obviously, not necessarily positive.
Replacing in Assumption A.1 (b) by
(b’) Each correspondence Pi : Xi ×
∏
h6=i pi
G(Xh) → Xi has open lower sections in Xi ×∏
h6=i pi
G(Xh) and open (in Xi) values at every (xh, x
g
h) ∈ X̂.
the same quasiequilibrium existence result can be proved using as in [14] the definition of Edgeworth
equilibria for this kind of constrained preferences, their existence and their decentralization by
nonnull quasiequilibrium prices. If the correspondences Pi are convex valued, Assumption (b’) is
slightly weaker than the assumption in Shafer–Sonnenschein [50] that the Pi have an open graph,
equivalent if correspondences Pi are assumed to have open values for every (xh, x
g
h) ∈ X (See a
proof of this equivalence in Shafer [48] or in [4]). Our emphasis on the conditions of existence of a
non trivial quasiequilibrium is justified by the well-known fact that several irreducibility conditions
on the economy guarantee that a non-trivial quasiequilibrium is an equilibrium.
Before closing this section, two remarks are in order.
Remark 3.4. The definition of an abstract economy and the statement of Lemma 3.3 allow for
considering more externality in consumers’ preferences than the simple existence of public goods.
Consumers’ preferences may depend more generally on the current consumption and production
allocation and on current prices as it was demanded by Arrow–Hahn [2]. In particular, Lemma 3.3
implies equilibrium existence in exchange economies with only private goods where individuals
value not only their own consumption but, as in [25], the current consumption allocation.
Remark 3.5. An economy with only private goods and no externality in preferences is a particular
case of the private provision model studied in this section. Proposition 3.1 obviously applies to
production economies without any public good or externality. This remark will be used in the next
section.
4. Quasiequilibrium and equilibrium existence in the Lindahl–Foley model
Economy E is now the economy associated with a Lindahl–Foley model as explained in the
beginning of section 2. We assume in particular that consumers have no endowment in public
goods, thus that for each i ∈ I, ei = (ωi, 0) and that the values of Pi : Xi → Xi does not depend
on the consumptions of the other consumers. One could get quasiequilibrium existence in the
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Lindahl–Foley model using, as for the private provision model, a simultaneous optimization proof
based on a slight modification of the definition and the quasiequilibrium existence result for an
abstract economy. This is not the strategy generally adopted sincer Foley [20, 21] and that we
follow now.
We extend3 the commodity space by considering each consumer’s bundle of public goods as a
separate group of commodities. On this (L + |I|K)- dimensional commodity space, we associate
with E the production economy
E ′ =
(
〈RL × R|I|K ,RL × R|I|K〉(X ′i, P ′i , e′i)i∈I , (Y ′j )j∈J , (θij) i∈I
j∈J
)
defined in the following way:
• For each i ∈ I,
– X ′i = {x′i = (xi, 0, . . . , Gi, . . . , 0) ∈ RL × (RK)|I| : (xi, Gi) ∈ Xi}
– e′i = (ωi, 0, . . . , 0, . . . , 0)
– For each x′i = (xi, 0, . . . , Gi, . . . , 0) ∈ X ′i,
P ′i (x
′
i) = {x˜′i = (x˜i, 0, . . . , G˜i, . . . , 0) ∈ X ′i : (x˜i, G˜i) ∈ Pi
(
(xi, Gi)
)}
• For each j ∈ J , Y ′j = {y′j = (yj , ygj , . . . , ygj , . . . , ygj ) ∈ RL × (RK)|I| : (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj}.
Let
A(E) =
((xi, G)i∈I , (yj , ygj )j∈J) ∈∏
i∈I
Xi ×
∏
j∈J
Yj :
∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
i∈I
ωi +
∑
j∈J
yj ; G =
∑
j∈J
ygj

denote the set of feasible Lindahl–Foley allocations of E and
A(E ′) =
((x′i)i∈I , (y′j)j∈j) ∈∏
i∈I
X ′i ×
∏
j∈J
Y ′j :
∑
i∈I
x′i =
∑
i∈I
e′i +
∑
j∈J
y′j

denote the set of feasible allocations of E ′. Under the definitions given above, ((x′i)i∈I , (y′j)j∈j) ∈
A(E ′) if and only if ((xi, G)i∈I , (yj , ygj )j∈J). Let X̂i (resp. X̂ ′i) and Ŷj (resp. Ŷ ′j ) denote the
projections of A(E) (resp. A(E ′)) on Xi (resp.X ′i) and Yj (resp. Y ′j ).
Economy E ′ is an economy with no public good and no externality. In order to apply to this
economy the quasiequilibrium existence result obtained in the previous section, we set on E the
following assumptions.
B.1: For each i ∈ I,
(a) Xi = RL+ × RK+ and X̂i is compact,
(b) Pi : Xi → Xi is lower semicontinuous,
(c) For each (xi, G) ∈ X̂i, Pi(xi, G) is convex,
and (xi, G) ∈ clPi(xi, G) \ Pi(xi, G),
(d) (ωi, 0) ∈ Xi;
B.2: For each j ∈ J , Yj is convex and closed, contains (0, 0), and Ŷj is compact.
It is readily seen that if E satisfies these assumptions, then E ′ satisfies the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 3.1. Thus, starting from a quasiequilibrium
(
(x′i)i∈I , (y
′
j)j∈J , pi
)
of E ′ with pi = (p, (pgi )i∈I) ∈
RL+|I|K \ {0}, and setting pg = ∑i∈I pgi , one deduces from the definition of X ′i and Y ′j that
3Independently of Foley, the same strategy was applied in an unpublished paper of F. Fabre-
Sender [11], quoted in [42].
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there exists
(
(xi, G), (yj , y
g
j )
) ∈ ∏i∈I Xi × ∏j∈J Yj such that ((xi, G), (yj , ygj ), (p, (pgi )i∈I)) is a
Lindahl-Foley quasiequilibrium of E . We have thus proved:
Proposition 4.1. Under the above Assumptions B.1 and B.2, the Lindahl–Foley model E has a
quasiequilibrium
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
) ∈∏i∈I Xi ×∏j∈J Yj × ((RL ×R|I|K) \ {0}).
The easy proof of the following corollary can be found in [18] and is sketched here for the sake
of completeness of the paper .
Corollary 4.1. Under the additional continuity assumption that each correspondence Pi has open
(in Xi) values at every (xi, G) ∈ X̂i, the quasiequilibrium is nontrivial if
NT:
∑
i∈I(ωi, 0) ∈ int
(
RL+ × RK+ −
∑
j∈J Yj
)
.
Proof. Recalling that the quasiequilibrium price (p, (pgi )i∈I) is nonnull, let (u, v) ∈ RL × RK be
such that (p,
∑
i∈I p
g
i ) · (u, v) < 0 and (
∑
i∈I , 0) + (u, v) ∈ (RL+ × RK+ ) −
∑
j∈J Yj . one can write
for some (xi)i∈I ∈ (RL+)I , G ∈ RK+ , (yj , ygj )j∈J ∈
∏
j∈J∑
i∈I
(ωi, 0) + (u, v) =
(∑
i∈I
xi, G)−
∑
j∈J
(yj , y
g
j
)
.
One deduces: ∑
i∈I
(p · xi + pgi ·G) < p ·
∑
i∈I
ωi +
∑
j∈J
(p,
∑
i ∈ Ipgi ) · (yj , ygj )
≤ p ·
∑
i∈I
ωi +
∑
j∈J
(p,
∑
i ∈ Ipgi ) · (yj , ygj ) =
∑
i∈I
(p · xi + pgi ·G).
It classically follows that at least one consumer i satisfies at (xi, G) his budget constraint with a
strict inequality, and thus is optimal at (xi, G) in his budget set as a consequence of the additional
continuity assumption made on consumers’ preferences.
In the following assumption, in order to get informations on respectively the quasiequilibrium
price of private goods and the vector of personalized prices of public goods, the local no-satiation
assumption contained in Assumption B.1 (c) is replaced by the stronger assumption of local no-
satiation in private goods at any component of a Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocation. At
every Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocation, one assumes in addition global no-satiation
in public goods for at least one consumer. This is summarized in the following assumption.
B.3: If
(
(xh)h∈I , G) is a Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocation,
(a) For each i ∈ I, for every neighborhood U of (xi, G) in Xi, there exists x′i such that
(x′i, G) ∈ U and (x′i, G) ∈ Pi((xi, G)),
(b) There exists i ∈ I and Gi such that (xi, Gi) ∈ Xi and (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi((xi, G)).
Under this assumption, the next proposition completes the previous one. One should note that,
besides the fact that B.3(a) precises the local no-satiation assumption contained in B.1(c), As-
sumptions B.3 (a) and (b) are tailored for getting the conclusions (1) and (2) of the next propo-
sition.
Proposition 4.2. Let
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
)
be the quasiequilibrium obtained in Propo-
sition 4.1. If each correspondence Pi has open (in Xi) values at every (xi, G) ∈ X̂i and if Assump-
tion B.3 is added to the different assumptions of Proposition 4.1, then
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(1) The quasiequilibrium price vector for private goods, p, is nonnull, provided that the quasiequi-
librium is non-trivial.
(2) If the quasiequilibrium is an equilibrium, then (pgi )i∈I 6= 0.
(3) Under some irreducibility condition, a non-trivial quasiequilibrium is actually an equilib-
rium.
Remark 4.2. The non-triviality condition NT is satisfied under the following mild conditions
that the total initial endowment in private goods is strictly positive and that each public good is
productible:
• ω  0,
• there is some (y, yg) ∈ Y :=∑j∈J Yj such that yg  0.
Remark 4.3. The role of an irreducibility assumption is to guarantee that, at the quasiequilibrium
price, all consumers can satisfy with a strict inequality their budget constraint as soon as this is
possible for at least one of them. Such a condition, inspired by Arrow–Hahn [2], was given in [18]:
IR: For any non-trivial partition {I1, I2} of the set I of consumers and for any Lindahl–
Foley feasible consumption allocation (xi, G)i∈I , there exists a consumption allocation
(x˜i, G˜)i∈I and ω˜ such that
• (x˜i, G˜) ∈ clPi(xi, G) ∀i ∈ I1 with for some i0 ∈ I1, (x˜i, G˜) ∈ Pi(xi, G),
• (∑i∈I x˜i, G˜) ∈ {(ω˜, 0)} +∑j∈J Yj with, for each coordinate ` ∈ L, ω˜` > ω` ⇒∑
i∈I2 ω
`
i > 0.
The obvious interpretation of this condition is that for any partition {I1, I2} of the set I of con-
sumers into two nonempty subgroups and for each feasible allocation, the group I1 may be moved
to a preferred position feasible with a new vector of total resources in private goods by increas-
ing the total resources of commodities which can be supplied in positive amount by the group
I2. To see how IR is an irreducibilty assumption, let
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
)
be the
quasiequilibrium of E , I1 be the set of consumers who can verify their budget constraint with a
strict inequality, I2 be the set of consumers for whom this is impossible, a set that we assume to
be nonempty. If (x˜i, G˜)i∈I and ω˜ are as in Assumption IR, we can write ω˜−ω = α
∑
i∈I2(ωi−x′i)
with α > 0 and xi ∈ Xi ∀i ∈ I2. Then
p ·
∑
i∈I1
(x˜i − ωi) + (
∑
i∈I1
pgi ) · G˜ >
∑
i∈I1
θij
∑
j∈J
(p · y˜j + pg · y˜gj ),
(1 + α)
[
p · (∑
i∈I2
x˜i + αx′i
1 + α
− ωi
)
+ (
∑
i∈I2
pgi ) ·
G˜
1 + α
] ≥ (1 + α)∑
i∈I2
θij
∑
j∈J
(p · y˜j + pg · y˜gj ),
that is
p·[∑
i∈I2
x˜i−
∑
i∈I2
ωi+ω−ω˜
]
+(
∑
i∈I2
pgi )·G˜ ≥ (1+α)
∑
i∈I2
θij
∑
j∈J
(p·y˜j+pg ·y˜gj ) ≥
∑
i∈I2
θij
∑
j∈J
(p·y˜j+pg ·y˜gj ),
the last inequality following from the positivity of the value of the maximum profit of each producer.
Summing in I ∈ I the first and the third of the previous relations, we get
p ·
∑
i∈I
(x˜i − ωi) + (
∑
i∈I
pgi ) · G˜ >
∑
j∈J
(p · y˜j + pg · y˜gj ),
which contradicts the feasibility for total resources ω˜ of the consumption allocation (x˜i, G˜)i∈I .
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Remark 4.4. In the literature, it is sometimes assumed that each consumer i ∈ I has a strictly
positive initial endowment ωi  0 and a continuous complete preference preorder i on his con-
sumptin set Xi, weakly monotone relative to public goods and strictly monotone relative to private
goods. Then non-triviality and irreducibilty conditions are of no use and, under the other condi-
tions of Proposition 4.1 and Part (b) of Assumption B.3, an equilibrium exists with p  0 and
(pgi )i∈I > 0 (that is ≥ 0 and not equal to 0).
5. Decentralization with prices of (weakly) Pareto optimal Lindahl–Foley
feasible consumption allocations
As already noticed, (weak) Pareto optimality of a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium consumption allo-
cation simply follows from the definitions. The same is true for Wicksell–Foley public competitive
equilibrium consumption allocations.
Proposition 5.1. Let
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g), (ti)i∈I
)
be a Wicksell–Foley public competi-
tive equilibrium. The consumption allocation (xi, G)i∈I is (weakly) Pareto optimal.
Proof. Assume by contraposition that there is
(
(xi)i∈I , G
)
such that (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) ∀i ∈ I and
(
∑
i∈I xi, G) = (
∑
i∈I ωi, 0) +
∑
j∈J(yj , y
g
j ). Thus
∑
j∈J yj =
∑
i∈I(xi − ωi) and
∑
j∈J y
g
j = G.
In view of Condition (1) in Definition 2.3, for every j ∈ J , p · yj + pg · yg ≤ p · yj + pg · yg =
pij(p, pg) and by summing on i, p ·
∑
j∈J yj + p
g · G ≤ ∑j∈J pij(p, pg). Let us first set for each
i, ti = p · ωi − p · xi. Summing on i,
∑
i∈I ti = −
∑
j∈J p · yj ≥ pg · G −
∑
j∈J pij(p, p
g). If∑
i∈I ti = p
g · G −∑j∈J pij(p, pg), the government proposal (G, (ti)i∈I) contradicts Condition
(3) of Definition 2.3. If
∑
i∈I ti > p
g · G −∑j∈J pij(p, pg), it suffices to define (t′i)i∈I such that
t′i ≤ ti ∀i ∈ Iand
∑
i∈I t
′
i = p
g ·G−∑j∈J pij(p, pg) to contradict Condition (3) of Definition 2.3,with
the government proposal (G, (t′i)i∈I).
Weak Pareto optimality of Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium allocations is not
surprising. Condition (3) of Definition 2.3 guarantees that, in some sense, the grand coalition
cannot block the equilibrium consumption allocation. In view of Proposition 2.1, (weak) Pareto
optimality of Lindahl–Foley feasible consumption allocations, obvious from the simple definitions,
is also a consequence of the previous proposition and is nothing else than a statement of the first
welfare theorem for public goods economies. The purpose of this section is to give converse results.
The next proposition simply extends to convex production sets Theorem of Section 3 in Fo-
ley [21].
Proposition 5.2. Assume B.1, B.2, B.3, NT and IR on E. Let ((xi, G)i∈I , (yj , ygj )j∈J) be a
Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation of E such that (xi, G)i∈I is (weakly) Pareto optimal. Then there
exists a price system (p, (pgi )i∈I) such that, setting p
g =
∑
i∈I p
g
i ,
(1) for every j ∈ J , for every (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj, (p, pg) · (yj , ygj ) ≤ (p, pg) · (yj , ygj ) := pij((p, pg),
(2) for every i ∈ I, (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi(xi, G) implies p · xi + pgi ·Gi > p · xi + pgi ·G.
Proof. Let
D =
{(
z, (Gi)i∈I
)− (∑
i∈I
ωi, 0, . . . , 0, . . . , 0
)
: z =
∑
i∈I
xi and (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi(xi, G) ∀i ∈ I
}
,
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F =
(y, (yg, . . . , yg, . . . , yg)) : (y, yg) =∑
j∈J
(yj , y
g
j ) with (yj , y
g
j ) ∈ Yj ∀j ∈ J
 .
The sets D and F are nonempty, convex and it follows from the (weak) Pareto optimality of the
allocation that D ∩ F = 6©. From the first separation theorem, there exists (p, (pgi )i∈I) 6= 0 and
α ∈ R such that for all j ∈ J , for all (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj , for all i ∈ I, for all (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi(xi, G),
p ·
∑
i∈I
(xi − ωi) +
∑
i∈I
pgi ·Gi ≥ α ≥ p ·
∑
j∈J
yj + (
∑
i∈I
pgi ) ·
∑
j∈J
ygj .
From local no-satiation at each (xi, G), and since
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
)
is a Lindahl–Foley feasible
allocation, we get
p ·
∑
i∈I
(xi − ωi) + (
∑
i∈I
pgi ) ·G = α = p ·
∑
j∈J
yj + (
∑
i∈I
pgi ) ·
∑
j∈J
ygj .
from which we deduce: for every j ∈ J , for every (yj , ygj ) ∈ Yj , (p,
∑
i∈I p
g
i )·(yj , ygj ) ≤ (p,
∑
i∈I p
g
i ))·
(yj , y
g
j ), and for every i ∈ I, (xi, Gi) ∈ Pi(xi, G) implies p · xi + pgi ·Gi ≥ p · xi + pgi ·G.
In view of Assumptions NT and IR, one shows exactly as in Section 4 that for every i ∈ I,
(xi, Gi) ∈ Pi(xi, G) actually implies p · xi + pgi ·Gi > p · xi + pgi ·G.
A first corollary of Proposition 5.2 shows that, under the assumptions of the proposition, the
set of (weakly) Pareto optimal consumption allocations actually coincides with the set of public
competitive equilibrium consumption allocations.
Corollary 5.1. Assume, as in Proposition 5.2, B.1, B.2, B.3, NT and IR on E and that(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
)
is a Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation of E such that (xi, G)i∈I is (weakly)
Pareto optimal. If (p, (pgi )i∈I) is the price vector obtained in Proposition 5.2 and If we set p
g =∑
i∈I p
g
i and for each i ∈ I, ti = p · ωi − p · xi, then
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, p
g), (ti)i∈I
)
is a
public competitive equilibrium.
Proof. From (1) in Proposition 5.2, the profit maximization is verified. Moreover,
∑
i∈I ti =
p ·∑i∈I(ωi − xi) = −p ·∑j∈J yj = pg · G −∑j∈J pij(p, pg). If ∑i∈I ti = pg · G −∑j∈J pij(p, pg)
with for each i ∈ I, (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G), one deduces from (2) in Proposition 5.2: p · xi + pgi ·G >
p · xi + pgi · G ∀i ∈ I, thus p ·
∑
i∈I xi +
∑
i∈I ti > p
∑
i∈I ωi, which proves Condition (3) of
Definition2.3. On the other hand, for each i ∈ I, p · xi + ti = p · ωi and (xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) implies
p · xi > p · xi thus p · xi + ti > p · ωi, which proves Condition (2) of the same definition.
To go further on the decentralization with prices of Lindahl–Foley feasible (weakly) Pareto
optimal allocations, notice that in Proposition 5.2,
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
)
corresponds
for the Lindahl–Foley model to what is called valuation equilibrium or equilibrium relative to
a price system in an economy with only private goods. In our public goods economy, with respect
to the (weak) Pareto optimal consumption allocation (xi, G)i∈I , prices (p, (p
g
i )i∈I , p
g =
∑
i∈I p
g
i )
have the same normative interpretation as in the usual Second Welfare Theorem. Announced and
enforced by a coordinating center, such prices have the property that no consumer will depart
from the Pareto optimal consumption allocation (xi, G)i∈I and that no producer will depart from
the corresponding production allocation (yj , y
g
j )j∈J . The achieved equilibrium corresponds to a
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vector of individual taxes for public goods equal to (pgi )i∈I and to a vector of individual lump sum
transfers (T i)i∈I , each one equal to
T i = p · xi + pgi ·G−
(
p · ωi +
∑
j∈J
θijpij(p, pg)
)
,
the sum over i ∈ I of T i being obviously equal to zero.
The interpretation of (p, (pgi )i∈I) in terms of Lindahl–Foley equilibrium prices for a convenient
redistribution of initial endowments and profit shares is more difficult.
A simple corollary of Minkowski–Farkas Lemma (see Corollary 2.3.2. in [19]) gives necessary
and sufficient conditions for finding profit shares (θ′ij) i∈I
j∈J
≥ 0 such that ∑j∈J θ′ij = 1 ∀i ∈ I and
for every i ∈ I,
p · xi + pgi ·G = p · ωi +
∑
j∈J
θ′ij(p · yj + pg · ygj ) = p · ωi +
∑
j∈J
θ′ijpij(p, p
g).
Corollary 5.2. Let
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J
)
be an equilibrium allocation relative to the price sys-
tem
(
p, (pgi )i∈I)
)
. There exists some (endogenous) system of profit shares (θ′ij) i∈I
j∈J
such that(
(xi, G)i∈I , (yj , y
g
j )j∈J , (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
)
is a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of the public goods economy
E ′ = ((RL+ × RG+, Pi, (ωi, 0))i∈I , (Yj)j∈J , (θ′ij) i∈I
j∈J
)
if and only if for every i ∈ I, for every α ∈ R,
pij(p, pg) ≤ α ∀j ∈ J =⇒ p · (xi − ωi) + pgi ·G ≤ α,
pij(p, pg) ≥ α ∀j ∈ J =⇒ p · (xi − ωi) + pgi ·G ≥ α.
A necessary condition is in particular that for every i ∈ I, p · (xi − ωi) + pgi ·G ≥ 0.
Corollary 5.3. If there is only one producer and if for every i ∈ I, p·(xi−ωi)+pgi ·G ≥ 0, then there
exists an endogenous system of profit shares, (θ′i)i∈I , such that
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (y,G), (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
)
is a
Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of the public goods economy E ′ = ((RL+ × RG+, Pi, (ωi, 0))i∈I , Y, (θ′i)i∈I).
In this case, defining for every G ∈ RK+ ,
c(G) = min{−p · y : (y,G) ∈ Y } = −max{p · y : (y,G) ∈ Y }
and for every i ∈ I, gi : RK+ → R by
gi(G) = (p
g
i − θ′ipg) ·G+ θ′ic(G)
then
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (y,G), (gi(G))i∈I
)
is what is called in Mas-Colell–Silvestre [40] a linear cost
share equilibrium of the economy E ′.
Proof. The first part of the corollary is actually a particular case of the previous one. Recall that,
in view of Assumption B.2, the maximum profit p · y + pg ·G is nonnegative. If p · y + pg ·G > 0,
define for each i ∈ I, θ′i = p·(xi−ωi)+p
g
i ·G
p·y+pg·G . If p · y + pg · G = 0, define for each i ∈ I, θ′i = 1|J| .
In both cases,
(
(xi, G)i∈I , (y,G), (p, (p
g
i )i∈I)
)
is a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium of the economy E ′ =(
(RL+ × RG+, Pi, (ωi, 0))i∈I , Y, (θ′i)i∈I
)
.
Let us now turn to the second part. The cost share system verifies
∑
i∈I(p
g
i − θ′ipg) = 0 and∑
i∈I θ
′
i = 1. On the other hand, in view of the profit maximization at (y,G), c(G) = −p ·G and
for each i ∈ I, gi(G) = pgi · G − θ′i(p · y + pgi · G), which implies p · xi + gi(G) = p · ωi. Now,
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(xi, G) ∈ Pi(xi, G) implies p · xi + pgi ·G > p · ωi + θ′i(p · y + pg ·G) ≥ p · ωi + θ′i(p · y + pg ·G) for
all y such that (y,G) ∈ Y , thus p · xi + gi(G) > p · ωi.
To sum up, starting from a (weakly) Pareto optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation of the
original economy and keeping unchanged the initial endowments of consumers, it is not necessar-
ily possible to redistribute the profit shares so that the (weakly) Pareto optimal allocation is a
Lindahl–Foley equilibrium allocation of the new economy. In the next section, under additional as-
sumptions, we will get for public goods economies the same result as in economies with only private
goods: (weakly) Pareto optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible allocations are Lindahl–Foley equilibrium
allocations of the economy obtained from the original one by redistributing initial endowments and
profit shares of consumers.
6. Lindahl–Foley equilibrium and the core
Let us now set the following additional assumptions:
B.4: Each consumer i ∈ I has a complete and transitive preference ordering i on Xi weakly
monotone in public goods: G˜i ≥ Gi implies (xi, G˜i)  (xi, Gi) ∀xi ≥ 0 (no public bads),
B.5: For each producer j ∈ J , Yj ⊂ RL × RK+ (public goods are never production
inputs).
The next proposition shows that, under B.4, Lindahl–Foley equilibrium consumption allocations
belong to the core.
Proposition 6.1. Assume B.4 on Economy E. If ((xi, G)i∈I , (yj , ygj )j∈J , (p, (pgi )i∈I)) is a Lindahl–
Foley equilibrium, then for each i ∈ I, pgi ≥ 0 and the consumption allocation (xi, G)i∈I belongs to
the core C(E).
Proof. We first claim that since (p, (pgi )i∈I) is a quasiequilibrium price, p
g
i ≥ 0 holds for each
i ∈ I. Indeed, it follows from transitivity and completeness of the preference preorders, monotony
in public goods and local no satiation in private goods at (xi, G) that Gi > G ⇒ pgi ·G ≥ pgi ·G.
Thus the vector price pgi cannot have a (strictly) negative component.
Then assume that the coalition S blocks (xi, G)i∈I via the S-feasible pair
(
(xi)i∈S , GS
)
. We
have for some (yj , y
g
j )j∈J ∈
∏
j∈J Yj :
(6.1) (
∑
i∈S
xi, G
S) =
∑
i∈S
(ωi, 0) +
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈J
θij(yj , y
g
j )
(6.2) (xi, GS) i (xi, G) for each i ∈ S.
From (6.1) and the equilibrium definition, we deduce:
p·
∑
i∈S
xi+(
∑
i∈S
pgi )·GS > p·
∑
i∈S
ωi+
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈J
θij(p, pg)·(yj , ygj ) ≥ p·
∑
i∈S
ωi+
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈J
θij(p, pg)·(yj , ygj ).
From (6.2) and our first claim, it follows:
p ·
∑
i∈S
xi + (
∑
i∈S
pgi ) ·GS ≤ p ·
∑
i∈S
xi + pg ·GS = p ·
∑
i∈S
ωi +
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈J
θij(p, pg) · (yj , ygj ).
We thus have a contradiction.
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The last proposition shows, under the assumptions B.4 and B.5, the complete symmetry be-
tween concepts and optimality properties of Lindahl–Foley equlibrium for a public goods economy
and Walras equilibrium for a private goods economy. However, it should be stressed that these
assumptions (made by Foley in [20, 21]) are necessary neither for the existence of Lindahl–Foley
equilibrium nor for the decentralization of (weakly) Pareto optimal Lindahl–Foley feasible alloca-
tions with personalized taxes and lump sum transfers.
Proposition 6.2. In addition to the assumptions of Proposition 5.2, assume B.4 and B.5 on
the economy E. Let ((xi, G)i∈I , (yj , ygj )j∈J) be a Lindahl–Foley feasible allocation of E such that
(xi, G)i∈I is (weakly) Pareto optimal and let (p, (p
g
i )i∈I) the price system whose Proposition 5.2 es-
tablishes the existence. The allocation together with the price system is a Lindahl–Foley equilibrium
of the economy E ′ = ((RL+ × RG+, Pi, (ω′i, 0))i∈I , (Yj)j∈J , (θ′ij) i∈I
j∈J
)
for
θ′ij =
{
pgi ·ygj
pg·ygj if y
g
j 6= 0
1
|I| if y
g
j = 0
and ω′i = xi −
∑
j∈J
θ′ijyj .
Proof. Recall that, in view of NT and IR, p 6= 0 and (pgi )i∈I 6= 0. From B.4 and B.5 and the
definition of the new profit shares, it follows that θ′ij ≥ 0 for every i ∈ I and for every j ∈ J , with for
every j ∈ J ,∑i∈I θ′ij = 1. Then, for every i ∈ I, p·xi+pgi ·G = p·ω′i+∑j∈J θ′ijp·yj+pgi ·∑j∈J ygj =
p · ω′i +
∑
j∈J θ
′
ijp · yj +
∑
j∈J θ
′
ijp
g · ygj = p · ω′i +
∑
j∈J θ
′
ijpij(p, p
g) and the proof is complete.
7. Concluding remarks
As Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium is less an equilibrium concept than a char-
acterization of (weak) Pareto optimality, we are left at the end of this presentation with two
equilibrium concepts.
The first one according to the analytical point of view adopted in this paper, the second one from
an historical point of view since its first elaborations dates back to 1985 [3, 6], is the public good
private provision equilibrium. As already noticed, private provision of public goods leads to sub-
optimal equilibrium allocations of private and public goods. This drawback, the same which was
pointed out by Samuelson, is at the origin of a huge literature on Pareto improving government
interventions, beginning with [3, 57], that is at the very time of the definition of public goods
private provision equilibrium.
The second one, the Lindahl–Foley equilibrium, dating back to 1967–1970 [20, 21], is the trans-
lation of the Lindahl solution refered to by Samuelson. However, most of economists, including
Samuelson himself, deny to this equilibrium the ability of being implemented by any market mech-
anism. Lindahl–Foley equilibrium does not satisfy the incentive compatibiity constraint as defined
by Hurwicz [32]: equilibrium does not requires that revealing the information necessary for the
price mechanism to function be the best strategy of individual consumers. Here also, a huge lit-
erature on mechanism design begins in 1977–1980 with the tentative of resolution of the free-rider
problem by Groves and Ledyard [28, 29]. This literature will tend to substitute the equilibrium
of a suitably defined mechanism to the equilibrium of the original economy and to found on the
government enforcement of appropriate mechanisms the public economic policy of public goods
market economies.
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